Ginebra, Suiza, 21 de septiembre del 2011.- En un discurso pronunciado el 21 de septiembre de
2012 en el ciclo de conferencias Schuman de la Cámara de Comercio Europea en
Singapur, el Director General Pascal Lamy dijo que “el estancamiento de las
negociaciones es político y debe abordarse a nivel político si queremos que el
sistema multilateral de comercio nos ayude a salir de la crisis, antes mejor
que después.” El Director General dijo lo siguiente:
“Fortalecimiento del
sistema multilateral de comercio”
It gives me
great pleasure to be here today to talk to the Singapore-based European
business community to discuss trends in trade and trade policy.
The global
economy
Before I do
so, let me just place trade in the broader developments in the global economy.
We have been overshadowed for some months by a second wave of concern about the
robustness of the global economy, following the recovery from the great
recession after 2008.
This part
of the world had much to do with the rapid comeback, as many Asian economies
re-established vigorous growth rates in the face of sharp contractions in
Europe, Japan and the United States. The road to recovery for the latter
economies entailed an expansionary macroeconomic stance, with both fiscal and
monetary policy contributing subsequently and significantly to what they have
to confront today in terms of fiscal deficits and both public and private
indebtedness.
I would not
like this to be interpreted as neglect of the adjustment challenges facing many
economies, which are very real and urgent.
Growth is
slowing almost everywhere this time around, proving, in case there was any doubt,
that there has been no decoupling in the world economy between the East and the
West, or the North and the South.
The
Eurozone has undergone some difficult and rather divisive times, raising quite
fundamental questions about the future vision for Europe and the role of the
common currency. Recent developments can be interpreted as the first credible
steps towards a roadmap that would point to Europe exiting the crisis in the
years to come. Success will be measured by the degree to which this crisis deepens
integration, as a tool for growth creating structural reforms.
Although
GDP growth is negative in Europe at present, and relatively sluggish or slowing
in most of the rest of the world, we can reasonably expect to see a better
situation in the years to come, barring any significant setback. The recovery
is going to be slow, however, and will require continued policy discipline in
those countries facing the largest economic sustainability challenges.
The trade
policy scene
Global
trade growth is going to be slower this year than we had forecast at the end of
the first quarter of 2012. Just today the WTO has downgraded its forecast of
trade growth in volume in constant prices from 3.7 per cent to 2.5 per cent.
These are
historically low numbers on average and it is not great news, but the numbers
essentially reflect the global slowdown and cannot be sourced to a separate set
of circumstances afflicting trade.
This
implies that trade policy has remained stable and economies have remained open.
This is largely true, although there have been some cases where governments
have introduced restrictive trade measures. And there is no room for
complacency. The pressures on governments for protectionist actions are more
intense today than they were in the aftermath of 2008. This is worrying and we
see it through our regular monitoring exercises in the WTO.
We are at a
stage in trade relations where we really do need to see a practical
reaffirmation from governments of their commitment to international trade
cooperation, and the institutional arrangements that support the multilateral
trading system. If we do not reaffirm this commitment with more than words,
especially when the going gets tough, we risk letting things get to a point where
it becomes harder to pull back from a path of continuing deterioration.
The
undisputed contribution that market opening and the maintenance of open markets
– on the basis of global rules – have made to growth and greater prosperity in
so many countries in the post-war period should be sufficient to convince
governments and the public of the need for continuing trade cooperation. But we
all know that things are not that simple. Governments feel short-term pressures
to take what seem like expedient actions in favour of domestic production,
forgetting not only the domestic consequences of such actions for efficiency
and productivity in the domestic economy, but also the likelihood of being
repaid in kind by trading partners.
I do not
believe this audience of international business interests will find much to
quarrel about when I talk of the benefits of a well-functioning and open
international economy. But perhaps you can use your influence in your contacts
with governments.
The rise of
regionalism and the multilateral trading system
An issue I
was billed to talk about this evening is the relationship between regional
trade agreements and the multilateral trading system. I appreciate that this is
a current topic in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia, with active discussions
going on in various formats, whether APEC, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
ASEAN and ASEAN +. ASEAN with its long standing track record on regional
integration is a major player in many of these configurations.
On average,
each member of the WTO belongs to no fewer than 13 separate preferential trade
agreements. This means that in addition to their multilateral commitments, WTO
members on average have to manage an additional 13 separate trade regimes. I do
not think you will disagree with me that this cannot be the most efficient way
to trade and to do business across national frontiers.
Several
problems arise.
First,
arrangements such as these impose trade costs. I know that some of the business
community are frustrated with multiple sets of rules of origin when they are
engaged in supply chain production involving several countries.
Second, the
continual addition of new preferential trade agreements to the existing stock
has a direct effect on the value of the stock. Existing agreements become less
preferential and imparts an instability factor on trading conditions.
Third,
while most preferential agreements do not appear to be built with the explicit
intention of excluding or penalizing third parties, they can still embed
geopolitical tensions and carry an exclusiveness that makes such arrangements a
poor second to a genuinely multilateral framework for trade relations.
Fourth,
topics which matter for many smaller and weaker members of the multilateral
trading system are left unaddressed, such as trade-distorting agriculture
subsidies, fishery subsidies or even trade defence.
Fifth,
whatever the political or trade policy intent of preferential trade agreements,
they can create undesirable divergences in policy approaches that make it harder
to build broader, more multilaterally based trading arrangements. This risk of policy divergence becomes more
acute in today’s world, where tariffs are increasingly an instrument of the
past and non-tariff measures are the cutting edge of trade policy. I should
like to say more about this in a minute.
Lest you
think I am mounting a campaign against regional trade initiatives, let me say a
little about why I believe preferential trade agreements have exploded in
recent years.
One reason
is that it has not proved easy for the multilateral trading system to make
progress, either in opening markets or improving the trade rules. Relying on
preferential agreements as a substitute reflects the reluctance of some
governments to use this format for doing trade business, and the frustration of
other governments at their lack of success in carrying forward multilateral
initiatives
Second,
preferential trade agreements can fulfil other needs to which the WTO cannot
respond, ranging from generic neighbourliness interests to explicit shared
non-trade concerns that can be more effectively addressed through closer
economic integration, including through trade. Moreover, where countries have
more closely knit economic interests with their neighbours, including through
global value chain relationships, they may be seeking deeper and more
far-reaching trade relationships than those they can hope to forge in a
multilateral context.
But we have
to be careful to imagine that preferential trade agreements are the “easy
route” to create a global level playing field.
The growing
importance of non-tariff measures
The first
difficulty arises from the rise in importance of non-tariff measures. They are
quite different in nature and scope than more traditional instruments of policy
aimed at or affecting trade.
They are
more difficult to identify and to measure. They often serve important public
policy objectives, rather than just being administrative instruments or
outright instruments of protection. What this means is that we do not necessarily
want to eliminate them. We therefore need to manage the challenge of
distinguishing between legitimate public policy design and disguised
protectionism.
Where a
non-tariff measure reflects a public policy objective, even the cleanest policy
design may add to the cost of doing business if countries espouse different
values and standards. This is not something that should simply be eliminated by
searching for culture-blind uniformity, but it is something to examine in terms
of least-trade-cost approaches.
In
practice, the way a non-tariff measure is administered, perhaps even on a
day-to-day basis, can be much more important than policy design issues. The
possibility of hijacking process for protectionist ends may be even more
troubling from a trade policy perspective.
Multilateralism
and global governance
My short
detour into the world of non-tariff measures illustrates, I believe, that a
number of important trade policy issues cannot be solved easily outside a
multilateral context. I could have talked about subsidies to make exactly the
same point.
We
therefore have a challenge in global governance, and that is how to ensure that
the benefits of a multilateral trading system are not forgotten and eroded away
through neglect. I have heard no government gainsay the value and importance of
a multilateral dimension to international trade cooperation. I would venture to
make the broader point that this brand of cooperation is crucial in many other
policy domains as well.
I would
argue, therefore, that it is to the global community’s benefit that
decision-makers find ways of reviving cooperation at the multilateral level and
move the WTO negotiations from its current state into an active mode where it
can contribute more effectively to our shared need for international
cooperation, which is both urgent and continuing. We all know that the WTO is
more than the Doha Development Agenda. There is the dispute settlement system,
the monitoring and surveillance and the Aid for Trade functions. But the impasse
in the negotiations is political and must be addressed at the political level
if we want the multilateral trading system to contribute to exiting the crisis,
sooner rather than later.
Thank you
for your attention.
Fuente: OMC